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THE COURTS, NATURAL RIGHTS, AND
RELIGIOUS CLAIMS AS KNOWLEDGE
Francis J. Beckwith*
The American Founders understood that the government
they put in place presupposed a cluster of rights that citizens
have by nature and that the government is obligated to
recognize. This is clearly spelled out in the Declaration of
Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."1 Or, in the
words of Alexander Hamilton, "[t]he Sacred Rights of
mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments
or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in
the whole volume of human nature, by the Hand of the
Divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal
power. "2

But these rights imply a deeper understanding about the
nature of human beings and the goods that are required for
their flourishing. For example, if a human being possesses by
nature a right to life, this means that other members of the
community are morally obligated to not violate that right to
* Mary Ann Remick Senior Visiting Fellow (2008-09), Center for the Ethics &
Culture, University of Notre Dame; Professor of Philosophy and Church-State
Studies, and Fellow and Faculty Associate in the Institute of Studies of Religion
(ISR), Baylor University. PhD, MA (philosophy), Fordham University; MJS
(law), Washington University School of Law, St. Louis. A special thank you to
Baylor University's Institute for the Studies of Religion, and its director Byron
Johnson, for providing me a summer 2008 fellowship so that I may complete
and revise this paper. I would like to also thank Michael Beaty, my department
chair at Baylor University. Because of Mike's encouragement and advocacy, I
was able to secure a visiting faculty appointment at the University of Notre
Dame for the 2008-09 school year so that I may work on a larger project of
which this article is a part.
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED (1775), reprinted in 1
THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 53, 113 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
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life. But this seems to imply something about human beings
and their nature that is moral in quality, a sacredness that
requires that we treat each other with a certain dignity and
respect that creatures of this sort ought to be treated. Thus,
natural rights seem to imply a natural moral law.
There are, of course, many complicated and important
issues concerning the relationship between natural rights and
natural law, such as the differences between Hobbsean
natural rights, Lockean natural rights, and Thomistic natural
law,3 as well as the disputes between the new and traditional
natural law theorists. In fact, some natural lawyers have
suggested that we ought to chuck the idea of natural rights
altogether because of their Enlightenment patrimony.'
Although these and other issues are certainly worthy of
serious assessment, in this article I will set them aside and
focus on the more modest question of whether it is reasonable
to believe that the natural moral law requires the existence of
God, as the American Founders believed.
What I mean by "reasonable" is not that reason requires
that one must believe it. Rather, what I am suggesting is
something less ambitious, namely, that a citizen who believes
that natural rights and natural law require the existence of
God embraces a philosophically defensible position that he or
she may legitimately claim is an item of knowledge. Nonbelieving citizens who disagree, therefore, are not ipso facto
irrational.
In order to make my case, this paper covers three
overlapping topics.
In Part I ("Faith, Reason, and the
Courts"), I critically discuss how some federal court opinions
imply or affirm that religious claims are by their nature
irrational, and thus cannot ever in principle be the grounds of
any public policy, which would apparently include natural
rights and their theistic paternity that the Founders
embraced and many citizens believe is the ground on which
all policy must rest.' As part of my discussion, I critically
3. See generally J. BUDZISZEWSKI, WRITTEN ON THE HEART: THE CASE FOR
NATURAL LAW (1997).
4. See generally A PRESERVING GRACE: PROTESTANTS, CATHOLICS, AND
NATURAL LAW (Michael Cromartie ed., 1997).
5. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL

THEORY 69 (2nd ed. 1984) ("there are no such rights and belief in them is one
with belief in witches and in unicorns").
6. See infra Part I.
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assess some comments by the well-known atheist and legal
theorist, Stephen Gey, who has claimed that religious beliefs
are by their nature irrational and thus cannot be items of
knowledge. 7 I then show how the courts seem to assume in
their opinions that theological claims can never rise to the
level of knowledge that may serve as defeaters to the
deliverances of so-called "secular" reasons.' I argue that this
view is deeply flawed. 9 My reason for doing this is to show
that if theological claims, including the claim that natural
rights and natural law have their grounding in God, can be
items of knowledge, then there is no a priori reason to exclude
theologically informed public policy proposals from the public
square on the grounds that they can never be items of
knowledge.
In Part II ("Natural Moral Law and Contemporary
Atheism"), I show how some contemporary atheists, seem to
presuppose a natural moral law and thus natural rights.1" I
conclude in Part III ("Why the Natural Moral Law Suggests
God") by offering an argument as to why I believe that
natural moral law seems to require the existence of God. 1
Part of my case includes a critical assessment of a Darwinian
account of the natural moral law offered by several
contemporary legal and political theorists. 2
I.

FAITH, REASON, AND THE COURTS

The sort of argument I am offering in this article has
become more difficult to make because of a common, though
mistaken, belief that religious claims are by their nature not
rational.
Unfortunately, this understanding has been
embraced by legal scholars and courts for several decades.
For instance, legal scholar Steven Gey asserts that belief in
God and liberal democracy are incompatible, that the first is
against reason while the latter demands it, Gey writes:
The establishment clause should be viewed as a reflection
of the secular, relativist political values of the
Enlightenment, which are incompatible with the
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part

I.
I.
I.
II.
III.B.
III.A.
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fundamental nature of religious faith. As an embodiment
of these Enlightenment values, the establishment clause
requires that the political influence of religion be
substantially diminished . . ..
Religious belief and
practice should be protected under the first amendment,
but only to the same extent and for the same reason that
all other forms of expression and conscience are
protected-because
the first amendment prohibits
government from enacting into law any religious, political,
or aesthetic orthodoxy . . .. [R]eligious principles are not
based on logic or reason, and, therefore, may not be proved
or disproved,.... [Rieligion asserts that its principles are
immutable and absolutely authoritative, democratic
theory asserts just the opposite. The sine qua non of any
democratic state is that everything political is open to
question; not only specific policies and programs, but the
very structure of the state itself must always be subject to
challenge. Democracies are by nature inhospitable to
political or intellectual stasis or certainty. Religion is
fundamentally incompatible with this intellectual
cornerstone of the modern democratic state. 13
Although claiming to side with the friends of reason,
Professor Gey's argument seems to provide more comfort to
its opponents.
First, his embracing of relativist political
values (whatever those are) is self-refuting. 4 Relativism is
the view that there are no universal and unchanging political
values that apply to all persons in all times and all places."
Yet Professor Gey states that a true proponent of liberal
democracy ought to be a relativist, for he claims that liberal
democracy and opposition to relativism are incompatible.6
But to claim that one ought to be a relativist is to make a
non-relative normative claim about what it means for a
member of the political community to be intellectually
virtuous. Thus, Gey's claim refutes itself. On the other hand,
13. Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?:
Reconsidering the
Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment,
52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 79, 167, 174 (1990).
14. For critiques of moral relativism and its application to political issues,
see HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF

MORALS AND JUSTICE (1986); FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, DEFENDING LIFE: A MORAL
AND LEGAL CASE AGAINST ABORTION CHOICE 1-17 (2007); FRANCIS J.
BECKWITH & GREGORY P. KOUKL, RELATIVISM: FEET FIRMLY PLANTED IN MID-

AIR (1998).
15. See BECKWITH & KOUKL, sura note 14.
16. Gey, supra note 13, at 179.
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if he denies that each member of a liberal democratic political
community ought to be a relativist on the matter of political
values, then necessarily it is not the case that each member of
a liberal democratic political community ought to be a
relativist on the matter of political values. Consequently,
whether he affirms or denies his claim, Gey's claim is refuted,
and thus we can safely say it is something that no friend of
reason ought to seriously entertain.
Second, although Gey associates his view with the
Enlightenment,"v it is difficult to square it with the nonrelativist moral and political philosophies of John Locke,
Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill, whose Enlightenment
credentials no one doubts.' 8
Third, Gey claims that "there can be no sacrosanct
principles or unquestioned truths in a democracy" and that
"no religion can exist without sacrosanct principles and
unquestioned truths." 9 But the latter claim is itself an
unquestioned truth about which Gey seems certain. For he
employs it as the ground by which the law may permanently
sequester a large segment of his fellow citizens from the
public square simply because they may choose to shape their
communities with policies that are informed by their religious
beliefs. Moreover, Gey's position assumes a first principledemocracy ought not to be based on unquestioned truthsthat he stipulates and for which he does not offer support,
and thus seems to function as an unquestioned truth. But if
Gey were to offer support for that truth, those grounds too
17. Id. at 79.
18. According to Locke, God endows us with unchanging natural rights and
that a just government has an obligation to ensure that these rights are not
trampled upon by other citizens or the government itself. SEE JOHN LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (Barnes & Noble Press 2004) (1690). For
Kant, the administration of justice cannot contravene the categorical
imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law." IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (Lewis White Beck trans., 2d ed. 1989); see also
ALLEN D. ROSEN, KANTS THEORY OF JUSTICE (1996). In the case of Mill, justice

is measured by his version of the principle of utility: "The creed which accepts
as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds
that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as
JOHN STUART MILL,
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."
UTILITARIANISM 9-10 (13th ed. 1891). None of these thinkers-leading lights of
the Enlightenment-affirmed or defended the relativism supported by Professor
Gey.
19. Id. at 174.
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would need support, and those grounds would then become
the new first principle. At some point, therefore, Gey must
rely on a first principle, a foundation, on which his claims
about liberal democracy and its support may rationally rest
and for which no other grounds are necessary. Thus, if, as
Gey argues, the political application of "unquestioned truths"
is a sufficient condition for political disenfranchisement of
fellow citizens, then his own position serves as the ground by
which the state may disenfranchise him, since his
philosophical arsenal has within it at least one unquestioned
truth, namely, that "democracy ought not to be based on
unquestioned truths." Consequently, Professor Gey's position
is by its own lights irrational, and thus we need not think of
it as an impediment to the political participation of citizens
who embrace what Professor Gey pejoratively labels as
"unquestioned truths."
I say "pejorative," since it seems to me that when Gey
writes of citizens who believe in these "unquestioned truths,"
he is claiming that they do so irrationally or without
adequate warrant. But this is surely not the case, for two
reasons: (1) There are numerous well-reasoned works critical
of the sort of crude relativism Gey offers, and none of these
works presents esoteric religious arguments whose premises
would seem irrational to many unbelievers;2 ° and (2) Gey does
not interact with any of the relevant academic literature on
Thus, it is
religious belief, morality, and rationality.2"
difficult to know how he would reply to the sophisticated and
compelling arguments offered by members of the growing
intellectual movement of theistic philosophers in AngloAmerican philosophy published before 1990 (the year Gey's
article appeared in print).22
Unfortunately, the idea that religious belief or any of its
20. See, e.g., works cited supra note 14.
21. See Gey, supra note 13.
22. See, e.g., MORTIMER J. ADLER, HOW TO THINK ABOUT GOD: A GUIDE FOR
THE 20TH CENTURY PAGAN (1980); MORTIMER J. ADLER, TEN PHILOSOPHICAL
MISTAKES (1985); WILLIAM LANE CRAIG, THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL
ARGUMENT (1979); FAITH AND RATIONALITY: REASON AND BELIEF IN GOD (Alvin
Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff eds., 1983); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS (1983); J. P.
MORELAND, SCALING THE SECULAR CITY: A DEFENSE OF CHRISTIANITY (1987);
ALVIN PLANTINGA, GOD AND OTHER MINDS: A STUDY OF THE RATIONAL
JUSTIFICATION OF BELIEF IN GOD (1967); RICHARD SWINBURNE, FAITH &
REASON (1987); RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (1979).
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attendant ideas (such as morality) is irrational (at worst) or
outside of the proper scope of reason's scrutiny (at best) is
Historian James
found in numerous court opinions.2 3
Hitchcock, after assessing many of these cases,2 4 concludes
that "the incoherence of the modern jurisprudence of the
Religion Clauses is the inescapable result of the Court's
The
*.".."25
positing of religion as essentially irrational .
following are a few of the cases presented by Hitchcock
(although numerous other cases could be cited or quoted,
space constraints prevent me from doing so).
In United States v. Ballard (1944),26 Justice William 0.
Douglas writes:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not
be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.
Religious experiences which are as real as life to some
may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they
may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they
can be made suspect before the law. Many take their
gospel from the New Testament. But it would hardly be
supposed that they could be tried before a jury charged
with the duty of determining whether those teachings
contained false representations. The miracles of the New
Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the
power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of
many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a
hostile environment found those teachings false, little
indeed would be left of religious freedom. 27
In a 1976 case, Justice William Brennan suggested that
"it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions
are to be reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith
whether or not rational or measurable by objective criteria. "28
He then added that "constitutional concepts of due process,
involving secular notions of 'fundamental fairness' . . . are
therefore hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical

23. See, e.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); School Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
24.

2 JAMES HITCHCOCK, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN

LIFE: FROM "HIGHER LAW" TO "SECTARIAN SCRUPLES" 67-76, 120-32 (2004).

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 128.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78.
Id. at 86-87.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 714-15.
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cognizance, 29 which would come as a surprise to Moses. °
According to Justice Tom C. Clark in School District of
Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp (1963),'31 "the
place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved
through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church
32
and the inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind."
Although Abington is a school prayer establishment clause
case in which religious practice initiated by school officials
rather than religious beliefs themselves are the object of
scrutiny, the opinion's understanding of religious belief as
personal and private seems to exclude it as a legitimate object
of reason.
In his concurring opinion in the 1977 case Wolman v.
Walter,33 Justice John Paul Stevens writes:
The distinction between the religious and the secular is
a fundamental one. To quote from Clarence Darrow's
argument in the Scopes case: "The realm of religion... is
where knowledge leaves off, and where faith begins, and it
never has needed the arm of the State for support, and
wherever it has received it, it has harmed both34the public
and the religion that it would pretend to serve."
As a principle of religious free exercise, the above
comments make sense, for the freedom of belief, as the
Founders envisioned it, is an ultima facie right since it is a
matter of conscience.3 5 But this is not where the real action is
in contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. Rather, it is in
29. Id. at 715.
30. See Numbers 35: 29-30 (New Revised Standard Version) ("These things
shall be a statute and ordinance for you throughout your generations wherever
you live. If anyone kills another, the murderer shall be put to death on the
evidence of witnesses; but no one shall be put to death on the testimony of a
single witness. Moreover you shall accept no ransom for the life of a murderer
who is subject to the death penalty; a murderer must be put to death.").
31. School Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
32. Id. at 226.
33. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
34. Id. at 265 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citation omitted).
35. This seems to be what Thomas Jefferson had in mind when he told the
Danbury Baptists in his famous letter to them "that the legitimate powers of
government reach actions only, & not opinions." Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in James Hutson, A Wall of
Separation: FBI Helps Restore Jefferson's Obliterated Draft, 57 LIBR. OF
CONGRESS

INFO.

BuLL.

136,

http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html.

139

(1998),

available

at
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the assumption of religion's irrationality or incapacity to be
rationally assessed in cases in which religious citizens try to
shape policy that their critics claim violates the establishment
clause. In other words, the above quotes and citations are at
too high a level of abstraction to be of any practical help in
establishment clause cases in which the idea of religion as
irrational is bluntly and uncritically employed. I say this
because religious claims, or those claims closely associated
with them (e.g., moral claims), are wide-ranging in their
content and thus in their status as possible knowledge. There
is no "one size fits all" when it comes to religious claims, just
as there is no "one size fits all" when it comes to claims in
disciplines as different as chemistry, English literature,
physics, stamp collecting, or the martial arts. For a court to
claim otherwise is for it to denigrate, without the appropriate
arguments or reasons, the epistemological status of all
religious claims. That is a philosophical project for which the
judiciary is not trained or is especially competent. And yet,
that has not prevented them from doing so.
For example, in the 2002 Ninth Circuit case concerning
the constitutionality of the recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance in public schools, Newdow v. Elk Grove Unified
School District, the court assumed that if the subject under
scrutiny could be shown to be "religious," the policy in
question violates the Establishment Clause. 36 But it seemed
to never occur to the court that if the so-called "religious"
claim were rationally defensible as an item of knowledge,
then the court would be in the odd position of forbidding the
public schools to teach what seems reasonable to believe is an
item of knowledge.
Judge Goodwin wrote in the court's opinion:
The text of the official Pledge, codified in federal law,
36. Newdow v. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002),
rev'd, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). It should be noted that the student on whose behalf
Mr. Newdow sued the school district, his daughter, could have opted out of the
public recitation of the Pledge:
Newdow does not allege that his daughter's teacher or school district
requires his daughter to participate in reciting the Pledge. Rather, he
claims that his daughter is injured when she is compelled to "watch
and listen as her state-employed teacher in her state-run school leads
her classmates in a ritual proclaiming that there is a God, and that
our's [sic] is 'one nation under God.'"
Id. at 601.
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impermissibly takes a position with respect to the purely
religious question of the existence and identity of God. A
profession that we are a nation "under God" is identical,
for Establishment Clause purposes, to a profession that
we are a nation "under Jesus," a nation "under Vishnu," a
nation "under Zeus," or a nation "under no god," because
none of 37
these professions can be neutral with respect to
religion.
By saying that the "under God" portion of the Pledge is
"purely religious," Judge Goodwin did not need to go any
further in assessing whether it is rationally defensible for the
government to suggest to its citizens that America is in fact
"under God," in the same sense that the Declaration of
Independence asserts that our rights are endowed to us by
our Creator. After all, as we saw above, the Supreme Court
has declared that religion is by its very nature "in the
individual heart," "not rational," "what men cannot prove,"
and "where knowledge leaves off."38 This is why Judge
Goodwin can reel off several religious figures in a rowVishnu, Jesus, Zeus, and the elusive "no God"-and claim
that if the government were to say it was "under" any of them
it would violate religious "neutrality."3 9 This indeed would
make sense if all religious claims are equally irrational, for in
that case "God" may indeed be replaced with any other name
associated with an irrational belief without violating any of
the government's obligations to conduct its business within
the confines of reason. This, however, is hardly a neutral
position, for it assumes, without argument, that all religious
claims are by nature irrational, and thus the role God plays
in "under God" is interchangeable with any religious or antireligious figure or claim. In other words, a court is not acting
in a neutral fashion in regard to religion if it issues a
judgment on the epistemological status of all religious claims
and then uses that judgment as an immutable standard by
which to exclude a priori all religious claims from serious
consideration in policy disputes. Although one could argue
that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was
intended to "separate church and state" even if those precise

37. Id. at 607-08 (emphasis added).
38. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
39. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607-08.
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words do not appear in the Constitution,4 ° it hardly follows
from this that it was intended as an epistemological guide by
which a court may separate faith from knowledge.
This is clearly evident when the court points out that the
plaintiff, Mr. Newdow, "claims that his daughter is injured
when she is compelled to 'watch and listen as her stateemployed teacher in her state-run school leads her classmates
in a ritual proclaiming that there is a God, and that our's [sic]
is "one nation under God.' "41 But she is only injured if "under
God" is a claim that she need not know or seriously entertain
as a short hand description of the relationship between our
In other words, her
natural rights and their source.
education is not diminished if it does not include "under God"
or the philosophical scaffolding of our rights that it implies.
In order to grasp this, imagine if the plaintiff were a
religious citizen who objected to his child being compelled to
watch and listen as her state-employed teacher in her staterun school instructs her classmates in a science class that the
entire universe including human beings is fully accounted for
by purely natural causes and does not require God to account
for them. In the latter sort of case, courts have suggested
that religiously motivated parents, school board members,
and/or legislators are constitutionally forbidden from trying
to remedy what these citizens perceive as an injustice in
school curricula and/or practices if the policy they are
proposing is an inherently religious concept. 42 In one case,
Kitzmiller v. Dover (2005), a school board merely required
that teachers for a few minutes at the beginning of class on
the first day of the semester instruct students that Darwinian
evolution is a theory with gaps, that one ought to keep an
open mind about such matters, and that there are resources
in the library that offer a contrary account of nature and its
apparent purposes. 3 The federal district court struck down
40. Of course, this was initially applied to only the federal government until
the Supreme Court incorporated the First Amendment through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
41. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 601.
42. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area
School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005); McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ.,
529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
43. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 708-09. Kitzmiller concerned a November
2004 policy formulated and promulgated by the board of the Dover Area School
District of Pennsylvania. Id. It required Dover High School ninth grade biology
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the policy on the grounds that the contrary account,
Intelligent Design (ID), 4 violated the establishment clause
because the court found that ID is "an inherently religious...
teachers to read in class a series of brief paragraphs:
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about
Darwin's Theory of Evolution and eventually to take a standardized
test of which evolution is a part.
Because Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as
new evidence is discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the
Theory exist for which there is no evidence. A theory is defined as a
well-tested explanation that unifies a broad range of observations.
Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs
from Darwin's view. The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is
available for students who might be interested in gaining an
understanding of what Intelligent Design actually involves.
With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to keep an
open mind. The school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to
individual students and their families. As a Standards-driven district,
class instruction focuses upon preparing students to achieve proficiency
on Standards-based assessments.
Id.
44. Here is a definition of ID that I published in 2007. I distinguish ID from
"creationism" in the third paragraph:
Intelligent design is not one theory. It is a shorthand name for a
cluster of arguments that offer a variety of cases that attempt to show,
by reasoning unaccompanied by religious authority or sacred scripture,
that intelligent agency rather than unguided matter better accounts for
apparently natural phenomena and/or the universe as a whole. Some
of these arguments challenge aspects of neo-Darwinism. Others make
a case for a universe designed at its outset, and thus do not challenge
any theory of biological evolution. Nevertheless, they all have in
common the notion that the human intellect has the capacity to acquire
knowledge of, or at least have rational warrant to believe in, an
inference that mind, rather than nonmind, best accounts for some
apparently natural phenomena or the universe as a whole.
But even ID advocates who criticize neo-Darwinism are technically
not offering an alternative to evolution, if one means by evolution any
account of biological change over time that claims that this change
results from a species' power to accommodate itself to varying
environments by adapting, surviving, and passing on these changes to
its descendents. This is not inconsistent with a universe that has
earmarks and evidence of intelligent design that rational minds may
detect....
Because ID arguments do not contain Genesis and its tenets as
propositions, and because ID advocates build their cases from
inferences that rely on empirical facts and conceptual notions, ID does
not run afoul of the U.S. Constitution. Of course, the cases for ID may
indeed fail as arguments, but that is not a violation of the
establishment clause.
Francis J. Beckwith, Intelligent Design, Religious Motives, and the
Constitution'sReligion Clauses, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN: WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI
& MICHAEL RUSE IN DIALOGUE 90, 93-94 (Robert B. Stewart ed., 2007).
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concept," 45 "not science," and as a theory is based on very
weak arguments.4 6 Thus, in Kitzmiller, the alleged injury to
the offended parents and students that the Dover policy was
intended to remedy is no injury at all, for the "injury" is what
a well-educated student ought to know and thus the Dover
policy advances a diminished pedagogy. Contrast this with
Newdow in which the alleged injury to Mr. Newdow's
daughter is, in the opinion of court, the result of her having to
sit through the recitation of a Pledge whose theological
content a well-educated student need not know in order to be
intellectually well-formed.4 7
45. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 722. The court asserts:
Robert Pennock, Plaintiffs' expert in the philosophy of science . . .
concluded that because its basic proposition is that the features of the
natural world are produced by a transcendent, immaterial, non-natural
being, ID is a religious proposition regardless of whether that religious
proposition is given a recognized religious label. It is notable that not
one defense expert was able to explain how the supernatural action
suggested by ID could be anything other than an inherently religious
proposition. Accordingly, we find that ID's religious nature would be
further evident to our objective observer because it directly involves a
supernatural designer.
Id. at 721 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 735. The court asserts:
We find that ID fails on three different levels, any one of which is
sufficient to preclude a determination that ID is science. They are: (1)
ID violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by invoking and
permitting supernatural causation; (2) the argument of irreducible
complexity, central to ID, employs the same flawed and illogical
contrived dualism that doomed creation science in the 1980's; and (3)
ID's negative attacks on evolution have been refuted by the scientific
community. As we will discuss in more detail below, it is additionally
important to note that ID has failed to gain acceptance in the scientific
community, it has not generated peer-reviewed publications, nor has it
been the subject of testing and research.
Id. For a critical analysis of Kitzmiller, see David K. DeWolf, John G. West &
Casey Luskin, Intelligent Design Will Survive Kitzmiller v. Dover, 68 MONT. L.
REV. 7 (2007). For a rebuttal to this article and a defense of Kitzmiller, see
Peter Irons, Disaster in Dover: The Trials (and Tribulations) of Intelligent
Design, 68 MONT. L. REV. 59 (2007). For a reply to Irons, see David K. DeWolf,
John G. West & Casey Luskin, Rebuttal to Irons, 68 MONT. L. REV. 89 (2007).
47. The Ninth Circuit in Newdow holds that the "under God" portion of the
Pledge has no primary secular purpose, and it does so by citing the 1954
Congressional record that includes the reasoning behind the 1954 insertion of
"under God" in the Pledge. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 609-12. This is what the
record states:
At this moment of our history the principles underlying our American
Government and the American way of life are under attack by a system
whose philosophy is at direct odds with our own. Our American
Government is founded on the concept of the individuality and the
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Nevertheless, someone could argue that if the Kitzmiller
court had concluded that the arguments for ID are indeed
strong, then its status as "science" or a "religious concept"
would be irrelevant to whether it is a proper subject of
academic inquiry with which public school science students
may or should become acquainted. 4' But it is unclear that
such a scenario is conceptually possible in the minds of jurists
who are so deeply committed to the notion that faith and
reason are on opposite sides of an unbridgeable chasm that
they lack the intellectual resourcefulness to imagine that a
religious belief can ever be rational and/or an item of
knowledge. For example, in Kitzmiller, Judge John E. Jones
makes the odd claim that "[a]fter a searching review of the
record and applicable case law, we find that while ID
arguments may be true, a proposition on which the Court
takes no position, ID is not science."49 This is odd for two
reasons. First, arguments are not true or false. Rather, true
and false are properties of the propositions-premises and
Arguments,
conclusions-of which arguments consist.
depending on their nature (whether they are deductive or
inductive), are valid, invalid, sound, unsound, strong or weak.
Arguments are no more true or false than are numbers, blue,

dignity of the human being. Underlying this concept is the belief that
the human person is important because he was created by God and
endowed by Him with certain inalienable rights which no civil
authority may usurp. The inclusion of God in our pledge therefore
would further acknowledge the dependence of our people and our
Government upon the moral directions of the Creator. At the same
time it would serve to deny the atheistic and materialistic concepts of
communism with its attendant subservience of the individual.
Id. at 610 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340).
Given the obvious intellectual content intended by the Congress that
inserted "under God" into the Pledge, it is seems clear to me that the
implication of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is that a well-educated student
need not know the Pledge's "under God" phrase in order to be intellectually
well-formed
48. That is, if the case for ID is extremely weak, then one has no warrant to
invoke extra-natural agent causation to account for certain natural phenomena
based on these flawed ID arguments. But what if one did have such warrant? In
that case, one would have to follow the arguments where they lead and conclude
either that the ground rules of science need not exclude non-natural agent
causes or that science, if it must exclude non-natural agent causes in order to
remain science, is not always the best way to arrive at knowledge, and perhaps
public schools are civically obligated to inform their students of that fact.
49. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735 (emphasis added).
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or green. Judge Jones' claim commits a category mistake.
There is another reason why Judge Jones' claim is odd.
In order to be charitable, let us assume what he means by "ID
arguments may be true" is that "the conclusions of ID
arguments may be true" or that "ID claims may be true."50
But in that case, he could consistently claim that ID
conclusions or claims may be true even though they are not
real items of knowledge and/or rationally defensible. After
all, it has always been true that atoms exist, even before we
knew they existed. So, perhaps all that he is saying is that
ID claims may be true, but they are not known because they
have not been adequately supported by good evidence and/or
strong argument. But in that case the apparent inherent
religiosity of ID is not relevant to Judge Jones' assessment of
the policy, since, in principle, it is possible that ID could
become well supported and a legitimate rival to materialist
accounts of natural phenomena. If that were to occur, it
would be strange for a court to say that ID still could not be
taught in public schools on the grounds that what is
inherently religious cannot cease to be inherently religious,
even if it is eminently reasonable for a citizen to embrace ID
as a rationally defensible account of the apparent design in
the natural universe. 1 Nevertheless, I suspect that Judge
50. That seems to me to be a fair interpretation, since Judge Jones spends
many pages assessing the arguments for ID and pronouncing them inadequate
based mostly on the plaintiffs expert testimony and the cross-examination of
the defendant's expert witnesses. Id. at 735-46. In fact, following the claim that
"ID arguments may be true" is the paragraph quoted supra note 45. Id.
51. Despite my interest in this subject and my sympathy for the ID
movement's goal to dismantle materialism and its deleterious implications on
our understanding of what is real and what counts as knowledge, I am not, and
have never been, a proponent of ID. My reasons have to do with my
philosophical opposition to the ID movement's acquiescence to the modern idea
that an Enlightenment view of science is the paradigm of knowledge. By
seeming to agree with their materialist foes that the mind or intellect cannot
have direct knowledge of real immaterial universals, such as natures, essences,
and moral properties, many in the ID movement seem to commit the same
mistake as the one committed by the late medieval nominalists such as William
of Ockham, who gave us what is often called "Ockham's razor," though Ockham
himself did not offer this precise formulation: "Pluralitas non est ponenda sine
necessitate" (translated: "entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily"). See
Paul Vincent Spade, William of Ockham, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY
§
4.1
(Edward
N.
Zalta
ed.,
2008),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ockham/. According to many
scholars, the practical consequence of "Ockham's razor" is that claims about a
thing's nature, purpose, or intrinsic dignity-universal properties it shares with
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Jones would dismiss this scenario as a conceptual
impossibility because he seems to have accepted an
understanding of theology and science that entails that they
are non-overlapping categories with the former never being
able to carry the epistemological freight to ever defeat the
deliverances of the latter.5 2
The contrast between Newdow and Kitzmiller is striking.
In Kitzmiller, the court declared as unconstitutional an
attempt on the part of the Dover school board to remedy an
apparent religious offense that requires a brief moment each
semester in which ID and intellectual modesty are suggested
to the students on a matter on which religion and science
intersect. 3 The offended students and parents who were on
other things of the same sort-are "unnecessary" for our scientific investigation
of the world because they don't add anything of explanatory importance to our
direct empirical observations. See, e.g., RICHARD M. WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE
CONSEQUENCES 44 (1948). But if one thinks of science as the only or best way of
knowing, then these claims are not "knowledge" and thus not real objects of
academic inquiry. This is a death knell for dogmatic and moral theology as
actual knowledge traditions. Although I continue to maintain that ID advocates
raise important questions about the nature of science and whether science
should presuppose naturalism (namely, the view that all that exists is the
material universe and that there is no mind, such as God, behind it), I have
doubts about ID's answers and whether these answers can offer an attractive
alternative to the inadequacies of the Enlightenment for the rationality of
religious belief.
52. Judge Jones writes:
To conclude and reiterate, we express no opinion on the ultimate
veracity of ID as a supernaturalexplanation. However, we commend to
the attention of those who are inclined to superficially consider ID to be
a true "scientific" alternative to evolution without a true understanding
of the concept the foregoing detailed analysis. It is our view that a
reasonable, objective observer would, after reviewing both the
voluminous record in this case, and our narrative, reach the
inescapable conclusion that ID is an interesting theological argument,
but that it is not science.
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 745-46 (emphasis added). If one replaces in the
above quote the term "theological" with "chemical" or "physical," then one can
easily see that Judge Jones embraces an understanding of faith and reason that
treats theology as if it can never in principle offer us knowledge that may count
against the deliverances of other disciplines. No one doubts that an insight in
chemistry may count against a theory in biology, or that the physicist may
impart to the engineer a theory that may benefit the work of the latter. This is
why it seems fair to say that when Judge Jones says that ID is theological and
"not science" that he means that it is "not knowledge." See James R. Stoner, Jr.,
The "Naked" University: What if Theology is Knowledge, Not Belief?., 62
THEOLOGY TODAY 515 (2006).
53. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa.
2005).
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the losing side of this case must put up with this
arrangement, as they should, since the court found that ID is
inherently religious and not rationally defensible. On the
other hand, in Newdow, the offended parent is not required to
put up with anything, for it is his offense that dictates the
arrangement that the court's opinion calls for.54 But nowhere
in the opinion does the Newdow court entertain the
possibility that the idea that America is "under God" is a
philosophically defensible position with which Mr. Newdow,
like the parents in Dover, must put up. 55 In both cases, the
victor is the "enlightened" party whose views are hostile to
the idea of theology as knowledge.
Thus, what accounts for the victories of the winning
parties in these two opinions is a common assumption
embraced by both courts. Each assumes that when it comes
to policy proposals that are connected to theological claims,
courts are required to employ an understanding of faith and
reason-or religious epistemology-that treats the claims in
question as if they could never in principle be rational. That
is, just as the Supreme Court held in the cases we covered
above, the Newdow and Kitzmiller courts assumed that
theology by its nature is irrational and thus can never in
principle be an item of knowledge. But, as we have seen in
our assessment of both Gey's arguments as well as these
court opinions, such an approach is riddled with many
conceptual puzzles and errors.56 And, as I briefly mentioned
in my critique of Gey, this posture toward theology is not even
an accurate portrayal of the way sophisticated believers
themselves think of and defend the relationship between faith
and reason.
Consequently, because reason does not require that one
accept the federal courts' opinions that imply or affirm that

54. See Newdow v. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir..
2002), rev'd, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).

55. See id.
56. See supra Part I.
57. See supra notes

14,

21; see also STEWART

GOETZ

& CHARLES

TALIAFERRO, NATURALISM (2008); J. P. MORELAND, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE

EXISTENCE OF GOD (2008); NATURALISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (William Lane
Craig & J. P. Moreland eds., 2000); ALVIN PLANTINGA, WARRANT AND PROPER
FUNCTION (1993); MICHAEL C. REA, WORLD WITHOUT DESIGN: THE
ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF NATURALISM (2002); THE RATIONALITY OF

THEISM (Paul Copan & Paul K. Moser eds., 2003).

446

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:49

theological claims are by their nature irrational, religious
claims cannot be excluded from being the grounds of public
policy because they can never be items of knowledge. For this
reason, it seems that what many citizens and the America
Founders have believed about their natural rights, that they
have a theistic paternity, may in fact be rationally defensible.
The purpose of the next two sections of this article is to make
that case.

II. NATURAL MORAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY ATHEISM
Almost all citizens-regardless of their political or
religious commitments-assume in their political vocabulary
a grammar of natural rights and natural moral law that the
state is obligated to honor, even when these citizens explicitly
deny a natural moral law or claim to embrace some sort of
relativism. As we shall see, the critics of God assume a cluster
of beliefs that inform and shape how one ought to conduct
oneself in public life and in relation to others. These beliefs,
it turns out, are moral in nature and required of all rational
agents, and thus they also inform the state on how it ought to
treat its citizens in relation to itself and how the citizens
ought to treat each other under its sovereignty. So, for
example, if slavery were to be reinstituted, our judgment of
the law's wrongness would depend on a prior understanding
of what it means to be a human being and why human beings
are not by nature property. We would say that when someone
is enslaved her rights are violated, even if the government
under which this occurs does not recognize such rights.
This belief in a natural moral law is so widely held that it
is rare to find anyone who does not employ it, even if they
verbally claim not to believe it. For example, the atheist,
Christopher Hitchens, in his book God Is Not Great, argues
that "religion poisons everything," blaming religious believers
and their beliefs for many of the atrocities of history.5"
Setting aside the question of Hitchens' historical accuracy
and philosophical acumen,5" his thesis asserts that human
58.

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT:

How RELIGION POISONS

EVERYTHING (2007).
59. A nice antidote to Hitchens' take on the influence of Christianity on
history are the following works: ROBERT ROYAL, THE GOD THAT DID NOT FAIL
(2006); RODNEY STARK, THE VICTORY OF REASON: HOW CHRISTIANITY LED TO
FREEDOM, CAPITALISM, AND WESTERN SUCCESS (2005); RODNEY STARK, FOR
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beings throughout history have had their rights violated by
other human beings who committed their wicked deeds in the
name of God and for bad reasons. Some of the cases Hitchens
cites, e.g., the Spanish Inquisition,6" involve legitimate
governments perpetuating and protecting acts that they had
the legal power to perpetuate and protect. 6 And yet this fact
would not move Hitchens to say that the acts he thinks wrong
are now right. Why? Because human beings have certain
rights by nature that the government is morally obligated to
recognize and protect. In fact, Hitchens writes that he and
other atheists "believe with certainty that an ethical life can
be lived without religion."62 Thus implying that he and others
have direct and incorrigible acquaintance with a natural
moral law that informs their judgments about what counts as
an ethical life. Consequently, the free-thinking posture that
one finds on the prior page in Hitchens' book-"[W]hat we
respect is free inquiry, openmindedness . . ." 63-becomes a
stingy dogma a page later when it comes to the "ethical life."
But this is good, since no one would want Hitchens or any
other person to begin to question the rationality of his moral
opposition to rape, murder, and theft.
Richard Dawkins, another prominent atheist, commits a
similar faux pas in his book The God Delusion,64 when he
laments the career path of Kurt Wise, who has, since 2006,
held the positions of Professor of Science and Theology and
Director of the Center for Theology and Science at the
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville,
Kentucky. Prior to that, Wise had taught for many years at
Bryan College, a small Protestant Evangelical college in
Dayton, Tennessee.6 5
According to Dawkins, Wise was at one time a promising
young scholar who had earned a degree in geology (from the

THE GLORY OF GOD: HOw MONOTHEISM LED TO REFORMATIONS, SCIENCE,
WITCH-HUNTS, AND THE END OF SLAVERY (2003).

60. For a view of the Inquisitions, including the Spanish Inquisition,
contrary to the one offered by Hitchens, see STARK, supra note 59, at 201-90.
61. See, e.g., HITCHENS, supra note 58, at 37-62.
62. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 5.
64. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2007).
65. Id. at 284-86.
Coincidentally, the school is named after William
Jennings Bryan, three-time Democratic presidential candidate and prosecutor
in the 1925 Scopes "Monkey Trial." Id. at 284.
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University of Chicago) and advanced degrees in geology and
paleontology from Harvard University, where he studied
under the highly acclaimed Stephen Jay Gould. Wise is also
a young-earth creationist, which means that he accepts a
literal interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis, and
maintains that the Earth is less than 10,000 years old.6 6 It is
not a position I hold, and for that reason I am sympathetic to
Dawkins' bewilderment of why Wise has embraced what
appears to many Christians as a false choice between one
controversial interpretation of Scripture (young-earth
creationism), and abandoning Christianity altogether. (But
that is another topic for another article).
In any event, at one point in his career Wise began to
understand that his reading of Scripture was inconsistent
with the dominant scientific understanding of the age of the
Earth and the cosmos. 67 Instead of abandoning what many of
us believe is a false choice, he continued to embrace it, but
this lead to a crisis of faith. Wise writes: "Either the
Scripture was true and evolution was wrong or evolution was
It was there that
true and I must toss out the Bible ....
night that I accepted the Word of God and rejected all that
would ever counter it, including evolution. With that, in
great sorrow, I tossed into the fire all my dreams and hopes in
science."6" So, Wise abandoned the possibility of securing a
professorship at a prestigious research university or institute.
Dawkins is disturbed by Wise's theological judgment and
its consequence on his obvious promise as a scholar,
researcher, and teacher. Dawkins writes:
I find that terribly sad; . . . the Kurt Wise story is just
plain pathetic-pathetic and contemptible. The wound, to
his career and his life's happiness, was self-inflicted, so
unnecessary, so easy to escape . . . . I am hostile to
religion because of what it did to Kurt Wise. And if it did
that to a Harvard educated geologist, just think what it
can do to others less gifted and less well armed.69
Of course, some religious believers including Christians
may be just as troubled as Dawkins. So, one need not be an
66. Id.
67. Id. at 285.
68. Id. (quoting Kurt P. Wise, 47, in IN Six DAYS: WHY 50 SCIENTISTS
CHOOSE TO BELIEVE IN CREATION 351, 354 (John Ashton ed., 1999)).
69. DAWKINS, supra note 64, at 285-86.
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atheist to raise legitimate questions about Professor Wise's
intellectual and spiritual journey.
But, given Dawkins'
atheism, there is something odd about his lament, for it
seems to require that Dawkins accept something about the
nature of human beings and the natural moral law that his
atheism seems to reject. Let me explain what I mean.
Dawkins harshly criticizes Wise for embracing a religious
belief that results in Wise not treating himself and his
talents, intelligence and abilities in a way appropriate for
their full flourishing. That is, given the opportunity to hone
and nurture certain gifts-e.g., intellectual skill-no one,
including Wise, should waste them as a result of accepting a
false belief. The person who violates, or helps violate, this
norm, according to Dawkins, should be condemned and we
should all bemoan this tragic moral neglect on the part of our
fellow(s). But the issuing of that judgment on Wise by
Dawkins makes sense only in light of Wise's particular
talents and the sort of being Wise is by nature, a being that
Dawkins seems to believe possesses certain intrinsic
capacities and purposes that if prematurely disrupted results
in an injustice. So, the human being who wastes his talents
is one who does not respect his natural gifts or the basic
capacities whose maturation and proper employment make
possible the flourishing of many goods. That is, the notion of
"proper function,"7" coupled with the observation that certain
perfections grounded in basic capacities have been
impermissibly obstructed from maturing, is assumed in the
very judgment Dawkins makes about Wise and the way by
which Wise should treat himself.
But Dawkins, in fact, does not actually believe that living
beings, including human beings, have intrinsic purposes or
are designed so that one may conclude that violating one's
proper function amounts to a violation of one's moral duty to
oneself. Dawkins has maintained for decades that the
natural world only appears to be designed, 7 which means
that his lament for Wise is misguided. For Dawkins is

70. See PLANTINGA, supra note 57.
71. Dawkins writes: "Darwin and his successors have shown how living
creatures, with their spectacular statistical improbability and appearance of
design, have evolved by slow, gradual degrees from simple beginnings. We can
now safely say that the illusion of design in living creatures is just that - an
illusion." DAWKINS, supra note 64, at 158.
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lamenting what only appears to be Wise's dereliction of his
duty to nurture and employ his gifts in ways that result in his
happiness and an acquisition of knowledge that contributes to
the common good. But because there are no designed natures
and no intrinsic purposes, and thus no natural duties that we
are obligated to obey, the intuitions that inform Dawkins'
judgment of Wise are as illusory as the design he explicitly
rejects.7 2 But that is precisely one of the grounds by which
Dawkins suggests that theists are irrational ought to
abandon their belief in God.7 3 So, if the theist is irrational for
believing in God based on what turns out to be pseudo-design,
Dawkins is irrational in his judgment of Wise and other
creationists who he targets for reprimand and correction. For
Dawkins' judgment rests on a premise that he has
uncompromisingly maintained throughout his career only
appearsto be true.
Thus, the religious believer agrees with Hitchens that
human beings have rights by nature, and the religious
believer also agrees with Dawkins' presupposition that
human beings have an intrinsic purpose, or design,7 4 that
places on each of us a moral obligation to nurture our natural
gifts and abilities in a way that help them to come to fruition
and achieve their natural end for the good of ourselves and
our community. So, the religious believer and these atheists
seem to agree on the existence of natural rights, a natural
moral law, and natural moral obligations, and that human
beings have an intrinsic end or purpose that they may
negligently or purposely fail to accomplish and be rightly
72. One, of course, may reject Wise's creationism and Dawkins' atheism and
embrace a point of view that offers a theistic-friendly account of design in the
universe. The most dominant option is Intelligent Design (ID), which I briefly
discussed supra Part II. For a clear and accessible presentation of the dominant
ID arguments, see MICHAEL J. BEHE, WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI & STEPHEN C.
MEYER, 9 SCIENCE AND EVIDENCE FOR DESIGN IN THE UNIVERSE (2000).

73. See DAWKINS, supra note 64, at 77-109.

74. Even if one finds Dawkins's views flawed, as I do, one need not embrace
the arguments of ID advocates in order to rationally embrace intrinsic purpose
or even design. See, e.g., LEON R. KASS, The Permanent Limits of Biology, in
LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS

277

(2002),

available

at

http://www.catholiceducation.orglarticles/medical-ethics/me0052.html; Michael
W. Tkacz, Thomas Aquinas vs. the Intelligent Designers: What Is God's Finger
Doing in My Pre-Biotic Soup?, in INTELLIGENT DESIGN: SCIENCE OR RELIGION?

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 275 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds.,
2007).
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judged immoral for such a failure.
75
III. WHY THE NATURAL MORAL LAW SUGGESTS GOD

Because liberal democracy assumes natural rights, and
because natural rights require a natural moral law, therefore,
liberal democracy assumes a natural moral law. This, as we
have seen, was the view of the signers of the Declaration of
Independence, even though they disagreed with each other on
a variety of religious questions.76 Again, as we have seen, it
seems that today both believers and non-believers have these
same intuitions.
Given this natural moral law, I want to now argue that
the existence of God best accounts for these correct intuitions.
The case I make is not a knock down drag-out proof for God's
existence from the existence of a natural moral law. But
rather, the case I make is much like a legal argument for a
defendant's guilt in a criminal trial. It is, in a sense, arguing
that given the "fingerprints" that one finds on natural rights
when one reflects on their nature, it seems that they are best
explained as the result of the hand and mind of the God of
theism. Although one may reject this conclusion, it is difficult
to conceive of a better alternative.
In the words of
philosopher Paul Copan, "objective moral values [the basis of
natural rights] are quite at home in a theistic universe.
Given God's existence, moral realism is natural. But given an
atheistic universe . . . , objective morality-along with its
assumptions of human dignity, rights, and moral
responsibility-is unnatural and surprising and 'queer.' ,77
Thus, given the natural moral law, there are really only two
options concerning its origin: it exists, but it is an accident, a
product of chance; or it is the result of intelligence.
75. Most of this section is adapted from portions of two of my works: Francis
J. Beckwith, Why I Am Not a Moral Relativist, in WHY I AM A CHRISTIAN:
LEADING THINKERS EXPLAIN WHY THEY BELIEVE 17 (Norman L. Geisler & Paul

K Hoffman eds., 2d ed. 2006); Francis J. Beckwith, Natural Law Without a
Lawgiver?, 68 REV. POLITICS 680 (2006) (reviewing LARRY ARNHART,
DARWINIAN CONSERVATISM (2005)). The argument I am presenting in this
section has similarities to the one developed by Gregory P. Koukl in BECKWITH
& KOUKL, supra note 14, at 156-70. This argument also has affinities with that
developed by C.S. Lewis in C.S. LEWIS, Right and Wrong as a Clue to the
Meaning of the Universe, in MERE CHRISTIANITY 3 (3d ed. 1952).
76. See DAVID L. HOLMES, THE FAITHS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2006).
77. Paul Copan, Can Michael Martin Be a Moral Realist?: Sic et Non, 1
PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 45, 58 (1999).

452

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:49

A. The Natural Law Does Not Depend on God.
If the natural moral law is a product of chance, then it is
a collection of brute facts that are the result of unguided,
naturalistic, evolution.7" But this does not seem adequate, for
if moral norms have no mind behind them, then there is no
justification to obey them. Consider this illustration: if while
playing Scrabble the letters randomly spell "Go to Baltimore,"
should I obey the command, buy a plane ticket, make hotel
reservations and/or take up temporary residence in
Baltimore? Of course not, for "the command" is a chancecreated phrase and is thus really no command at all. As
Gregory P. Koukl points out, "Commands are communications
between two minds. Chance might conceivably create the
appearance of a moral rule, but there can be no command if
no one is speaking." 9 A command created by accident "can be
safely ignored."8 0
Suppose, however, that the evolutionary naturalist (EN)
replies that morality exists because it is necessary for
survival.
According to this view, moral rules against
adultery, murder, stealing, etc., are the result of the forces of
natural selection "choosing" those genes that perpetuated
traits that are more conducive to the preservation of the
human species. In the words of Robert Wright: "If within a
species there is variation among individuals in their
hereditary traits, and some traits are more conducive to
survival and reproduction than others, then those traits will
(obviously) become more widespread within the population.
The result (obviously) is that the species' aggregate pool of
hereditary traits changes."81 Behavioral patterns that help
sustain these species-preserving traits are part of what we
call "morality."
78. I say unguided and naturalisticevolution to distinguish it from theistic
evolution, which affirms an evolutionary account of living organisms that is
ultimately guided by God. A theistic evolutionist may, of course, consistently
maintain that the moral law comes from God, which is why this critique only
applies to atheistic, or naturalistic, evolutionists. See, for example, the work of
Francis S. Collins, Director of the National Human Genome Institute Research
Institute (as of summer 2008) in FRANCIS S. COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF GOD:
A SCIENTIST PRESENTS EVIDENCE FOR BELIEF (2006).
79. BECKWITH & KOUKL, supra note 14, at 167.
80. Id.
81. ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

AND EVERYDAY LIFE 23 (1994).

2009]

RELIGIOUS CLAIMS AS KNOWLEDGE

453

So, according to the EN understanding, Mind is not a
necessary condition to account for the diversity of natures of
the living beings that arise out of the vast eons during which
natural selection cooperates with random genetic mutations
and perhaps other evolutionary forces. Consequently, living
beings do not possess the stable realist natures that Thomas
Aquinas and Aristotle believed exist.8 2 Rather, for the EN,
the natures we ascribe to living beings are merely names (or
"nominal essences") that are shorthand ways to label beings
that have roughly similar characteristics. So, we may say
that resulting from human nature are those practices, habits,
and institutions the tool-using, language-employing, upright
bipeds that have DNA similar to our own. But this human
nature tells us nothing normative. It merely describes what
is statistically ordinary and generally species-preserving.
The EN thinks that is all that we need to ground natural law.
According to Larry Arnhart, who calls himself a
"Darwinian conservative," 3 scholarship in political theory has
incorporated this evolutionary understanding in order to
account for the human sentiments that are the foundation of
family life. Citing the work of renowned political scientist
James Q. Wilson, Arnhart writes:
Wilson . . . argues that natural selection may have
promoted a generalized psychological propensity to
"attachment" or "affiliation." What he calls "affiliation"
corresponds to what Aristotle calls "friendship" (philia): a
natural drive to social bonding diversely expressed as
sexual, familial, companionate, political, or philanthropic
attachments .... Wilson believes the human sentiments
of sympathy and benevolence, which throughout most of
human evolutionary history would have enhanced
reproductive fitness by inclining human parents to care
for their young, can now be extended to people who are not
offspring or even to nonhuman animals.84
There are, however, several problems with the
evolutionary naturalist account. First, because helping the
weak, the genetically marred, and the social parasite are not
82. See THOMAS AQUINAS, ON HUMAN NATURE (Thomas S. Hibbs ed., 1999);
ARISTOTLE, DE AMIMA (ON THE SOUL) (J. A. Smith trans., 2007), available at

http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/a8so/index.html.
83. See LARRY ARNHART, DARWINIAN CONSERVATISM (2005).
84. Larry Arnhart, The New DarwinianNaturalism in Political Theory, 33
ZYGON 369, 377 (1998) (citations omitted).
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evolutionarily helpful, why do we have a sense of duty and
incumbency to help those less fortunate than ourselves?
Suppose the EN answers that we would not have this sense of
duty and incumbency unless it was evolutionarily helpful.
There are at least two problems with this answer. First, it
begs the question, for it assumes that whatever moral senses
we have they must be the result of evolution. But because the
question is whether naturalistic evolution can explain all our
moral senses, it is circular reasoning to assume that whatever
moral senses we have they must be the result of naturalistic
evolution. Second, because it is clear that not every human
being has a moral sense that he or she has a duty and
incumbency to help those less fortunate themselves, on what
grounds could the EN say that these human beings are
mistaken in their moral viewpoint? After all, people who lack
this moral sense have existed all over the globe for
generations, and if they too are the products of evolution,
perhaps having such people in our population is necessary for
the preservation of the species. If that is the case, then
"moral sense" is person-relative and is not universally
binding. But that undermines the notion of a natural moral
law that atheists, such as Hitchens and Dawkins, must
sustain in order to be able to issue their strong universal
moral judgments against atrocities and wrongdoings
committed throughout human history and across cultures in
the name of religion. On the other hand, if the EN bites the
bullet and maintains that those who lack the moral sense to
see that they have an obligation to those weaker than
themselves are morally wrong regardless of what moral sense
they may feel, then there is a morality above naturalistic
evolution by which we can make moral judgments about the
moral senses of different segments of our population that
resulted from unguided evolution.
Thus, naturalistic
evolution lacks explanatory power in accounting for the
natural moral law.
Second, naturalistic evolution is concerned only with the
sorts of behavior that are conducive to the preservation of the
species. But morality is more than just behavior, for it
includes, among other things, motive and intent. In fact, a
moral judgment is incomplete without taking these into
consideration. For one can be immoral without any behavior,
simply on the basis of motive and intent. For example, I can
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intend to carry out a murder and never do it. One can be
immoral simply on the basis of motive and intent even if the
behavior has "good" results. For example, if I intend to trip
someone in order to cause harm, but it results in the person
not being hit by a car and thus saving his or her life, the
results are good even though what I did was immoral. On the
other hand, "bad" results may be part of a morally good act
simply on the basis of motive and intent. For example, if a
surgeon operates on a terminal patient with the intent to
remove a cancer, but during the operation the patient dies of
cardiac arrest, the surgeon has not acted immorally. Since
naturalistic evolution, at best, can only describe what
behaviors are conducive to the preservation of the species and
does not address the role of motive and intent in evaluating
those behaviors, naturalistic evolution is an inadequate
explanation for the existence of moral norms.
Third, the naturalistic evolutionary explanation of
morality is merely descriptive. That is to say, it merely tells
us what behaviors in the past may have been conducive to the
survival of the species and why I may have on occasion moral
feelings to act consistently with those behaviors.
But
naturalistic evolution cannot tell me whether I ought to act
on those feelings in the present and in the future. Granted, I
am grateful that people in the past behaved in ways that
made my existence possible. But why should I emulate only
those behaviors that many people today say are "good?" After
all, some people in the past raped, stole, and murdered. And
I know of many people today who have feelings to rape, steal,
and murder. Perhaps these behaviors are just as important
for my existence and the preservation of the species as the
"good" behaviors. Unless there is a morality above the
morality of naturalistic evolution, it is difficult see how one
can distinguish between morally good and bad actions if both
types may have been conducive to the preservation of the
species.
Consequently, evolutionary naturalism may very well
explain why each of us may have certain moral feelings on
occasion. But it cannot say why citizen X ought to perform (or
not perform) act Y in circumstance Z. To cite another
example: Arnhart argues that the traditional family best
protects and preserves the human species if it is widely
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practiced.8 5 But what do we say to the eighty-something
Hugh Hefner, who would rather shack up with five twentysomething buxom blondes with which he engages in carnal
delights
with
the
assistance
of
state-of-the-art
pharmaceuticals? Mr. Hefner is no doubt grateful that his
ancestors engaged in practices (e.g., the traditional family)
that made his existence and lifestyle possible. But why
should he emulate only those practices that many people
today (e.g., Arnhart and I) say are "good"? After all, some of
our ancestors were Hefnerian in their sensibilities, taking on
a concubine or two and running off with one of them every
once in a while. Perhaps this practice was just as necessary
for Mr. Hefner's existence and the preservation of the species
as were the "good" behaviors practiced by history's squares.
Because we have always had in our population Hugh Hefners
of one sort or another, it is not clear to me how Arnhart can
distinguish between good and bad practices if both sorts may
have played a part in the survival of the human race, unless
there is a morality by which we assess the morality of
evolution. But this would seem to lead us back to the old
natural law, the one that has its source in Mind and that is
not subject to the unstable flux of naturalistic evolution.
Fourth, although evolutionary naturalists such as
Arnhart and Wilson seem to be correct that certain
sentiments (e.g., love of family, children) are consistent with a
natural law understanding of community and advancing the
common good, these sentiments themselves seem inadequate
to ground moral action or to account for certain wrongs. For
example, Tony Soprano's love of kin nurtures sentiments that
lead to clear injustices, e.g., "rubbing out" enemies, about
which Tony and family do not seem particularly troubled. 6
In that case, the wrongness of the act is located not in the
sentiments of its perpetrators (or even its victims, if the
victims, for some reason, were convinced that they deserved
to be rubbed out) but in a judgment informed by moral norms
that stand above, and are employed by free agents, to assess
acts and actors apart from their sentiments. Again, we are
85. ARNHART, supra note 83, at 46-58.
86. "Tony Soprano" is a fictional character in the HBO series, "The
Sopranos." In the show, Mr. Soprano (played by actor James Gandolfmi) was
the head of an organized mob family with its headquarters in New Jersey. The
Sopranos (HBO 1999-2007).

20091

RELIGIOUS CLAIMS AS KNOWLEDGE

457

back to the old natural law that has its source outside of
naturalism's unguided torrent.
B. The Natural Law Does Depend on God.
Because the natural moral law does not seem to be the
product of chance, only one option remains: it has its source
in an intelligence. What sort of intelligence could this being
be? It must be the sort of being who could be the ground of a
natural moral law.
So, it could not be a contingent
intelligence, one whose existence and moral authority is
dependent upon something else outside itself. For in order to
be the ground of morality, a being must not receive its
existence and moral authority from another, for that other
being, if it is not contingent, would then be the ground of the
natural moral law. Therefore, the source of the moral law
must be a self-existent, perfectly good being who has the
juridical authority that requires that we owe him our duty to
obey. It seems only fitting to call such a being "God." As
Richard Taylor puts it, "A duty is something that is owed...
but something can be owed only to some person or persons.
There can be no such thing as a duty in isolation ....

The

concept of a moral obligation [is] unintelligible apart from the
idea of God. The words remain, but the meaning is gone.""7
Of course, one could challenge this conclusion and the
premises that support it, and many reasonable people will
find such a challenge to be an adequate reason to reject the
belief that the existence of God best accounts for the natural
moral law. But from that it does not follow that one is
unreasonable if one in fact believes, based on an argument
such as the one I have offered here, that the existence of God
best accounts for the natural moral law, and by implication
natural rights. After all, none of the premises I have offered
in my case are obviously unreasonable, that one must reject
them because they are contrary to reason. In fact, it seems
that the premises are widely held by reasonable people, who
have diligently and carefully studied the issues and have
come to the conclusion that in fact the existence of God best
accounts for the natural moral law. Consequently, it seems
reasonable to believe, as the American Founders believed,
87. BECKWITH & KOuKL, supra note 14, at 168 (quoting RICHARD TAYLOR,
ETHICS, FAITH & REASON 83-84 (1985).
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that if there exists a natural moral law, the foundation of
natural rights, it is best accounted for by the existence of God.
And if it is reasonable to hold this belief, then it should be
uncontroversial if a community passes legislation that
requires that its public school students understand that it is
reasonable to believe that America is "one nation, under God."

